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9 Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all
strategies used in correlated equilibrium
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Abstract
We show on a 4 × 4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all
strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games.
This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash
dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfy-
ing some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and
the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated
equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as
new pure strategies.
JEL classification numbers: C73 ; C72
Key-words: correlated equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics; elimina-
tion; as-if rationality
1 Introduction
A number of positive connections have been found between Nash equilibria and
the outcome of evolutionary dynamics. For instance, for a wide clas of dynamics,
if a solution converges to a point from an interior initial condition, then this
point is a Nash equilibrium (Weibull, 1995). However, solutions of evolutionary
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dynamics need not converge and may cycle away from the set of Nash equilibria
(Zeeman, 1980; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
Since the set of correlated equilibria of a game is often much larger than
its set of Nash equilibria, it might be hoped that correlated equilibria better
capture the outcome of evolutionary dynamics than Nash equilibria. This hope
is reinforced by the recent litterature on adaptive processes converging, in a
time-average sense, to the set of correlated equilibria (Hart, 2005).
It was found, however, that there are games for which, for some initial condi-
tions, the replicator dynamics eliminate all strategies belonging to the support
of at least one correlated equilibrium (Viossat, 2007a). Thus, only strategies
that do not take part in any equilibrium remain, rulling out convergence of any
kind of time-average to the set of correlated equilibria.
The purpose of this article is to show, on a 4× 4 example, that elimination
of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium does not only occur under the
replicator dynamics and for very specific games, but for many dynamics and for
an open set of games. We also study the robustness of this result when agents
are explicitly allowed to use mixed strategies.
The article is organized as follows. After presenting the framework and no-
tations, we introduce the games we consider and explain the technique used to
show that all strategies used in correlated equilibrium are eliminated (section
2). Sections 3, 4 and 5 deal in turn with monotonic or weakly sign-preserving
dynamics, the best-response dynamics and the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dy-
namics. Section 6 and the appendix show that elimination of all strategies used
in correlated equilibrium still occurs when agents are explicitly allowed to play
mixed strategies. Section 7 concludes.
Framework and notations. We study single-population dynamics in
two-player, finite symmetric games. The set of pure strategies is I = {1, 2, .., N}
and SN denotes the simplex of mixed strategies (henceforth, “the simplex”).
Its vertices ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , correspond to the pure strategies of the game. We
denote by xi(t) the proportion of the population playing strategy i at time t
and by x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xN (t)) ∈ SN the population profile (or mean strategy).
We study its evolution under dynamics of type x˙(t) = f(x(t),U), where U =
(uij)1≤i,j≤N is the payoff matrix of the game. We often skip the indication of
time. For every x in SN , the probability distribution on I × I induced by x is
denoted by x⊗ x. If A is a subset of SN , then conv(A) denotes its convex hull.
We assume known the definition of a correlated equilibrium distribution
(Aumann, 1974) and, with a slight abuse of vocabulary, we write throughout
correlated equilibrium for correlated equilibrium distribution. A pure strat-
egy i is used in correlated equilibrium if there exists a correlated equilibrium
µ under which strategy i has positive marginal probability (since the game is
symmetric, whether we restrict attention to symmetric correlated equilibria or
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not is irrelevant; see footnote 2 in (Viossat, 2007a)). Finally, the pure strategy
i is eliminated (for a given solution x(·) of a given dynamics) if xi(t) → 0 as
t→ +∞.
2 A family of games with a unique correlated
equilibrium
The games considered in (Viossat, 2007a) were 4 × 4 symmetric games with
payoff matrix
Uα =


0 −1 ε −α
ε 0 −1 −α
−1 ε 0 −α
−1+ε
3
+ α −1+ε
3
+ α −1+ε
3
+ α 0

 (1)
with ε in ]0, 1[, and 0 < α < (1 − ε)/3. The 3 × 3 game obtained by omitting
the fourth strategy is a Rock-Paper-Scissors game (RPS). This game has a
unique Nash equilibrium : (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), which is also the unique correlated
equilibrium. When α = 0, the fourth strategy of the full game earns the same
payoff as n = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0), and there is a segment of symmetric Nash
equilibria : for every x ∈ [n, e4] = {λn + (1 − λ)e4, λ ∈ [0, 1]}, (x,x) is a
Nash equilibrium. For α > 0, e4 earns more than n, so (e4, e4) is a strict Nash
equilibrium, and the unique correlated equilibrium is e4 ⊗ e4. However, for α
small enough, the best-response cycle e1 → e2 → e3 → e1 remains and the
corresponding set :
Γ = {x ∈ S4 : x4 = 0 and x1x2x3 = 0}. (2)
is asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamics
x˙i(t) = xi(t) [(Ux(t))i − x(t) ·Ux(t)] .
It follows that there exist games for which, for an open set of initial conditions,
the replicator dynamics eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
(Viossat, 2007a).
This article shows that elimination of all strategies used in correlated equi-
librium does not only occur for non-generic games and the replicator dynamics,
but for an open set of games and many other dynamics. This is done by showing
that, for many dynamics, there are values of α and ε such that, for every game
in a neighborhood of (1):
(i) the unique correlated equilibrium is e4 ⊗ e4;
(ii) for an open set of initial conditions, strategy 4 is eliminated.
Point (i) is the object of the following proposition:
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Proposition 2.1 For every ε in ]0, 1[ and every α in ]0, (1− ε)/3[, every game
in the neighborhood of (1) has a unique correlated equilibrium: e4 ⊗ e4.
Proof. Since the set of games with a unique correlated equilibrium is open
(Viossat, 2007b) and game (1) has a unique correlated equilibrium, it follows
that every game in a neighborhood of (1) has a unique correlated equilibrium.
Since e4 ⊗ e4 is clearly a correlated equilibrium of every game sufficiently close
to (1), the result follows.
To prove (ii), a first method is to show that in (1), and every nearby game,
the cyclic attractor of the underlying RPS game is still asymptotically sta-
ble. This is the method we use for monotonic dynamics and for weakly sign-
preserving dynamics. When in the underlying RPS game the attractor is not
precisely known, but the Nash equilibrium is repelling, another method may be
used. It consists in showing that there is a tube surrounding the segment [n, e4]
which repels solutions and such that outside of this tube, x4 decreases along all
trajectories. We use this method for the Brown-von-Neumann-Nash dynamics.
For the best-response dynamics, both methods work.
3 Monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynam-
ics
We first need some definitions. Consider a dynamics of the form
x˙i = xigi(x) (3)
where the C1 functions gi have the property that
∑
i∈I xigi(x) = 0 for all x
in S4, so that the simplex S4 and its boundary faces are invariant. Such a
dynamics is monotonic if the growth rates of the different strategies are ranked
according to their payoffs:1
gi(x) > gj(x)⇔ (Ux)i > (Ux)j ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ I.
It is weakly sign-preserving (WSP) (Ritzberger and Weibull, 1995) if whenever
a strategy earns below average, its growth rate is negative:
[(Ux)i < x ·Ux]⇒ gi(x) < 0.
Dynamics2 of type (3) implicitly depend on the payoff matrix U. Thus, a more
correct writing of (3) would be: x˙i = xigi(x,U). Such a dynamics depends
1This property goes under various names in the literature: relative monotonicity in (Nach-
bar, 1990), order-compatibility of pre-dynamics in (Friedman, 1991), monotonicity in (Samuel-
son and Zhang, 1992), which we follow, and payoff monotonicity in (Hofbauer and Weibull,
1996).
2Instead of dynamics of type (3), Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) consider dynamics of the
more general type x˙i = hi(x), that need not leave the faces of the simplex positively invariant.
Thus, we only consider a subclass of their WSP dynamics.
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continuously on the payoff matrix if, for every i in I, gi depends continuously
on U. A prime example of a dynamics of type (3) which is monotonic, WSP,
and depends continuously on the payoff matrix is the replicator dynamics.
Finally, a closed subset C of S4 is asymptotically stable if it is both:
(a) Lyapunov stable: for every neighborhood N1 of C, there exists a neigh-
borhood N2 of C such that, for every initial condition x(0) in N2, x(t) ∈ N1 for
all t ≥ 0.
(b) locally attracting: there exists a neighborhood N of C such that, for
every initial condition x(0) in N , minc∈C ||x(t) − c|| →t→+∞ 0 (where || · || is
any norm on RI).
Proposition 3.1 Fix a monotonic or WSP dynamics (3) that depends contin-
uously on the payoff matrix. For every α in ]0, 1/3[, there exists ε > 0 such that
for every game in the neighborhood of (1), the set Γ defined by (2) is asymptot-
ically stable.
Proof for monotonic dynamics. Consider a monotonic dynamics (3). Un-
der this dynamics, for every game in the neighborhood of (1), the set Γ is a
heteroclinic cycle. That is, a set consisting of saddle rest points and the saddle
orbits connecting these rest points. Thus we may use the asymptotic stability’s
criteria for heteroclinic cycles developed by Hofbauer (1994) (a more accessible
reference for this result is theorem 17.5.1 in (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)).
Specifically, associate with the heteroclinic cycle Γ its so-called characteristic
matrix. That is, the 3 × 4 matrix whose entry in row i and column j is gj(ei)
(for i 6= j, this is the eigenvalue in the direction of ej of the linearization of the
vector field at ei):
1 2 3 4
e1 0 g2(e1) g3(e1) g4(e1)
e2 g1(e2) 0 g3(e2) g4(e2)
e3 g1(e3) g2(e3) 0 g4(e3)
(gi(ei) = 0 because ei is a rest point of (3)).
Call C this matrix. If p is a real vector, let p < 0 (resp. p > 0) mean that
all coordinates of p are negative (resp. positive). Hofbauer (1994) shows that
if the following conditions are satisfied, then Γ is asymptotically stable:
There exists a vector p in R4 such that p > 0 and Cp < 0. (4)
Γ is asymptotically stable within the boundary of S4.
3 (5)
Therefore, to prove proposition 3.1, it is enough to show that for every α in
]0, 1/3[, there exists ε > 0 such that, for every game in the neighborhood of (1),
3That is, for each proper face (subsimplex) F of S4, if Γ ∩ F is nonempty, then it is
asymptotically stable for the dynamics restricted to F .
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conditions (4) and (5) are satisfied. We begin with a lemma. In the remainder
of this section, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i− 1 and i+ 1 are counted modulo 3.
Lemma 3.2 For every 0 < α < 1/3, there exists ε > 0 such that in game (1),
for every i in {1, 2, 3},
g4(ei) < 0 and 0 < gi+1(ei) < −gi−1(ei). (6)
Proof. For ε > 0, at the vertex ei, the payoff of strategy 4 (resp. i + 1)
is strictly smaller (greater) than the payoff of strategy i. Since the growth
rate of strategy i at ei is 0, this implies by monotonicity g4(ei) < 0 (resp.
gi+1(ei) > 0). It remains to show that gi+1(ei) < −gi−1(ei). For ε = 0, we
have: (Uei)i = (Uei)i+1 > (Uei)i−1 so that 0 = gi+1(ei) > gi−1(ei). There-
fore gi+1(ei) < −gi−1(ei) and since the dynamics depends continuously on the
payoff matrix, this still holds for small positive ε.
We now prove proposition 3.1. Fix α and ε as in lemma 3.2. Note that since the
dynamics we consider depends continuously on the payoff matrix, there exists
a neighborhood of the game (1) in which the strict inequalities (6) still hold.
Thus, to prove proposition 3.1, it suffices to show that (6) implies (4) and (5).
(6) ⇒ (4) : It follows from (6) that if p1 = p2 = p3 = 1 and p4 > 0, then
Cp < 0. Therefore, condition (4) is satisfied.
(6) ⇒ (5) : We use again characteristic matrices. Let Cˆ denote the 3 × 3
matrix obtained from C by omitting the fourth column. This corresponds to the
characteristic matrix of Γ, when viewed as a heteroclinic cycle of the underlying
3× 3 RPS game. In this RPS game, the set Γ is trivially asymptotically stable
on the relative boundary of S3 (Γ is the relative boundary!). Furthermore, for
pˆ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) > 0, the last inequality in (6) implies that Cˆpˆ < 0. There-
fore, it follows from theorem 1 of Hofbauer (1994) that, in the 4×4 initial game,
Γ is asymptotically stable on the face spanned by e1, e2, e3. Asymptotic stabil-
ity on the face spanned by ei, ei+1, e4 follows easily from the following facts :
on this face, ei+1 is a sink, ei a saddle, every solution starting in ]ei, ei+1] con-
verges to ei+1, and x(t) depends smoothly on x(0). This concludes the proof.
Proof of proposition 3.1 for WSP dynamics. The proof is exactly the
same, except for the proof of lemma 3.2, which is as follows: Fix a WSP dy-
namics (3). For concreteness, set i = 2. At e2, strategy 4 earns less than average.
Therefore g4(e2) < 0. Now consider the case ε = 0: at every point x in the
relative interior of the edge [e1, e2], strategy 3 earns strictly less than average
hence its growth rate is negative. By continuity at e2 this implies g3(e2) ≤ 0.
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Since at e2, strategy 1 earns strictly less than average, it follows that g1(e2) < 0,
hence g3(e2) < −g1(e2). Since the dynamics depends continuously on the payoff
matrix, this still holds for small positive ε.
To establish (6), it suffices to show that g3(e2) is positive for every sufficiently
small positive ε. Let ε > 0. If λ > 0 is sufficiently small then, for all µ > 0 small
enough, the unique strategy which earns weakly above average at x = (λµ, 1−
µ− λµ, µ, 0) is strategy 3, hence gi(x) < 0 for i 6= 3. Since
∑
1≤i≤4 xigi(x) = 0,
it follows that x1g1(x) + x3g3(x) > 0, hence λµg1(x) + µg3(x) > 0, hence
g3(x) > −λg1(x). Letting µ go to zero, we obtain g3(e2) ≥ −λg1(e2) > 0
(g1(e2) < 0 was proved in the previous paragraph).
4 Best-response dynamics
4.1 Main result
The best-response dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991; Matsui, 1992) is given
by the differential inclusion:
x˙(t) ∈ BR(x(t))− x(t), (7)
where BR(x) is the set of best responses to x:
BR(x) = {y ∈ SN : y ·Ux = max
z∈SN
z ·Ux}.
A solution x(·) of the best-response dynamics is an absolutely continuous func-
tion satisfying (7) for almost every t. For the games and the initial conditions
that we will consider, there is a unique solution starting from each initial con-
dition.4
Consider a 4× 4 symmetric game with payoff matrix U. Let
V (x) := max
1≤i≤3

(Ux)i − ∑
1≤i≤4
uiixi

 and W (x) := max(x4, |V (x)|). (8)
For every game sufficiently close to (1), the set
ST := {x ∈ S4 : W (x) = 0} (9)
is a triangle, which, following Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995), we call the
Shapley triangle.
Proposition 4.1 For every game sufficiently close to (1), if strategy 4 is not
a best response to x(0), then for all t ≥ 0, x(t) is uniquely defined, and x(t)
converges to the Shapley triangle (9) as t→ +∞.
4We focus on forward time and never study whether a solution is uniquely defined in
backward time.
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Proof. We begin with a lemma, which is the continuous time version of the
improvement principle of Monderer and Sela (1997):
Lemma 4.2 (Improvement principle) Let t1 < t2, let b be a best response
to x(t1) and let b
′ ∈ S4. Assume that x˙ = b − x (hence the solution points
towards b) for all t in ]t1, t2[. If b
′ is a best response to x(t2) then b
′·Ub ≥ b·Ub,
with strict inequality if b′ is not a best response to x(t1).
Proof of lemma 4.2. Between t1 and t2, the solution points towards b. There-
fore there exists λ in ]0, 1[ such that
x(t2) = λx(t1) + (1 − λ)b. (10)
If b′ is a best response to x(t2) then (b
′ − b) ·Ux(t2) ≥ 0 so that, substituting
the right-hand-side of (10) for x(t2), we get:
(1 − λ)(b′ − b) ·Ub ≥ λ(b− b′) ·Ux(t1). (11)
Since b is a best response to x(t1), the right-hand-side of (11) is nonnegative,
and positive if b′ is not a best response to x(t1). The result follows.
Proof of proposition 4.1 for game (1). Fix a solution x(·) of (7) such
that strategy 4 is not a best response to x(0). Note that for any x in S4,
BR(x) 6= conv ({e1, e2, e3}), because e4 strictly dominates (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0).
Thus, either there is a unique best response to x(0) or, counting i modulo 3,
BR(x(0)) = conv ({ei, ei+1}) for some i in {1, 2, 3}. Assume for concreteness
that strategy 1 is the unique best response to x(0). The solution then initially
points towards e1, until some other pure strategy becomes a best response. Due
to the improvement principle (lemma 4.2), this strategy can only be strategy 2.
Thus, the solution must then point towards the edge [e1, e2]. Since strategy 2
strictly dominates strategy 1 in the game restricted to {1, 2} × {1, 2}, strategy
2 immediately becomes the unique best response. Iterating this argument, we
see that the solution will point towards e2, till 3 becomes a best response, then
towards e3, till 1 becomes a best response again, and so on.
To show that this behaviour continues for ever, it suffices to show that the
times at which the direction of the trajectory changes do not accumulate. This
is the object of the following claim, which will be proved in the end:
Claim 4.3 The time length between two successive times when the direction of
x(t) changes is bounded away from zero.
Now recall (8), and note that for game (1) the terms uii are zero, so that
V (x) = max1≤i≤3(Ux)i. Let v(t) := V (x(t)), w(t) := W (x(t)). When x(t)
points towards ei (with i in {1, 2, 3}), we have x˙4 = −x4 and
v˙ = (Ux˙)i = (U(ei − x))i = −v. (12)
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Therefore w˙ = −w. Since for almost all time t, x(t) points towards e1, e2 or
e3, it follows that w(t) decreases exponentially to 0. Therefore x(t) converges
to the Shapley triangle.
To complete the proof, we still need to prove claim 4.3:
Proof of claim 4.3: In what follows i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i+ 1 is counted modulo
3. Fix an initial condition and let
g(t) := max
1≤i,j≤3
[(Ux(t))i − (Ux(t))j ]
denote the maximum difference between the payoffs of strategies in {1, 2, 3}. Let
tki denote the k
th time at which strategy i becomes a best response and choose i
such that tki < t
k
i+1. Simple computations, detailed in (Viossat, 2006, p.11-12),
show that:
g(tk+1i ) =
1
ε3 + g(tki )(1 + ε+ ε
2)
g(tki ). (13)
Since ε < 1, it follows that for small g(tki ), we have g(t
k+1
i ) > g(t
k
i ); therefore
g(tki ) is bounded away from zero. Now, since (Ux(t))i − (Ux(t))i+1 decreases
from g(tki ) to 0 between t
k
i and t
k
i+1, and since the speed at which this quantity
varies is bounded, it follows that tki+1− t
k
i is bounded away from zero too. That
is, the time length between two successive times at which the direction of x(t)
changes is bounded away from zero.
Proof of proposition 4.1 for games close to (1). Counting i modulo 3,
let αi = uii − ui−1,i and βi = ui+1,i − uii, i = 1, 2, 3. Let i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. For
every game sufficiently close to (1), αi and βi are positive, α1α2α3 > β1β2β3,
u4i < uii, and strategy 4 strictly dominates (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0). Furthermore, for
every game satisfying these conditions, the proof of proposition 4.1 for game (1)
goes through. The only differences are that equation (12) becomes
v˙ = (Ux˙)i −
∑
1≤j≤4
ujj x˙j = (U(ei − x))i −

uii − ∑
1≤j≤4
ujjxj

 = −v
and equation (13) becomes
g(tk+1i ) =
α1α2α3
β1β2β3 + g(tki )(α1α2 + α1β3 + β2β3)
g(tki ).
See (Viossat, 2006) for details. This completes the proof.
Note that for every η > 0, we may set the parameters of (1) so that the
set {x ∈ S4 : e4 ∈ BR(x)} has Lebesgue measure less than η. In this sense,
the basin of attraction of the Shapley triangle can be made arbitrarily large.
Similarly, for the replicator dynamics, the basin of attraction of the heteroclinic
cycle (2) can be made arbitrarily large (Viossat, 2007a). For additional results
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on the best-response dynamics and of the replicator dynamics in 4 × 4 games
based on a RPS game, see (Viossat, 2006).
5 Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
The Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics (henceforth BNN) is given by:
x˙i = ki(x)− xi
∑
j∈I
kj(x) (14)
where
ki(x) := max(0, (Ux)i − x ·Ux) (15)
is the excess payoff of strategy i over the average payoff. We refer to (Hofbauer, 2000;
Berger and Hofbauer, 2006) and references therein for a motivation of and re-
sults on BNN.
Let G0 denote the game (1) with α = 0. Recall that U0 denotes its payoff
matrix and n =
(
1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 0
)
the mixed strategy corresponding to the Nash equi-
librium of the underlying RPS game. It may be shown that the set of symmetric
Nash equilibria of G0 is the segment E0 = [n, e4].
5 This section is devoted to a
proof of the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1 If C is a closed subset of S4 disjoint from E0, then there
exists a neighborhood of G0 such that, for every game in this neighborhood and
every initial condition in C, x4(t)→ 0 as t→ +∞.
Any neighborhood of G0 contains a neighborhood of a game of kind (1), hence
an open set of games for which e4 ⊗ e4 is the unique correlated equilibrium.
Together with proposition 5.1, this implies that there exists an open set of games
for which, under BNN, the unique strategy played in correlated equilibrium is
eliminated from an open set of initial conditions.
The essence of the proof of proposition 5.1 is to show that, for games close
to G0, there is a “tube” surrounding E0 such that: (i) the tube repels solutions
coming from outside; (ii) outside of the tube, strategy 4 earns less than average,
hence x4 decreases. We first show that in G0 the segment E0 is locally repelling.
The function
V0(x) :=
1
2
∑
i∈I
k2i =
1
2
∑
i∈I
[max (0, (U0x)i − x ·U0x)]
2
is continuous, nonnegative and equals 0 exactly on the symmetric Nash equilib-
ria, i.e. on E0, so that V0(x) may be seen as a distance from x to E0. Fix an
initial condition and let v0(t) := V0(x(t)).
5The game G0 has other, asymmetric equilibria, but they will play no role.
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Lemma 5.2 There exists an open neighborhood Neq of E0 such that, under
BNN in the game G0, v˙0(t) > 0 whenever x(t) ∈ Neq\E0.
Proof. It is easily checked that:
n ·U0x = e4 ·U0x ∀x ∈ S4 (16)
(that is, n and e4 always earn the same payoff) and
(x− x′) ·U0e4 = (x− x
′) ·U0n = 0 ∀x ∈ S4, ∀x
′ ∈ S4 (17)
(that is, against e4 [resp. n], all strategies earn the same payoff). Furthermore,
as follows from lemma 4.1 in (Viossat, 2007a), for every p in E0 and every
x /∈ E0,
(x − p) ·U0x = (x− p) ·U0(x− p) =
1− ε
2
∑
1≤i≤3
(
xi −
1− x4
3
)2
> 0. (18)
Hofbauer (2000) shows that the function v0 satisfies
v˙0 = k¯
2 [(q− x) ·U0(q− x)− (q− x) ·U0x] (19)
with x = x(t), k¯ =
∑
i ki and qi = ki/k¯. It follows from equation (17) that if
p ∈ E0, then against p all strategies earn the same payoff. Therefore the second
term (q− x) ·U0x goes to 0 as x approaches E0. Thus, to prove lemma 5.2, it
suffices to show that as x approaches E0, the first term (q − x) ·U0(q − x) is
positive and bounded away from 0. But for x /∈ E0,
min
1≤i≤3
(U0x)i ≤ n ·U0x = (U0x)4 < x ·U0x (20)
(the first inequality holds because n is a convex combination of e1, e2 and e3,
the equality follows from (16) and the strict inequality from (18) applied to
p = e4). It follows from (U0x)4 < x ·U0x that k4 = 0 hence q4 = 0; similarly,
it follows from min1≤i≤3(U0x)i < x ·U0x that qi = 0 for some i in {1, 2, 3}.
Together with (18) applied to x = q, this implies that for every p in E0,
(q− p) ·U0(q− p) =
1− ε
2
∑
1≤i≤3
(
qi −
1
3
)2
≥
1− ε
18
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 5.1. Consider first the BNN dynamics in the game
G0. Recall lemma 5.2 and let
0 < δ < min
x∈S4\Neq
V0(x) (21)
11
(the latter is positive because V0 is positive on S4\E0, hence on S4\Neq, and
because S4\Neq is compact). Note that if V0(x) ≤ δ then x ∈ Neq. Therefore it
follows from lemma 5.2 and δ > 0 that
v0(t) = δ ⇒ v˙0(t) > 0. (22)
Let
Cδ := {x ∈ S4 : V0(x) ≥ δ}.
Since δ > 0, the sets Cδ and E0 are disjoint. Therefore, by (18) applied to
p = e4,
x ∈ Cδ ⇒ (U0x)4 − x ·U0x < 0 (23)
so that x4 decreases strictly as long as x ∈ Cδ and x4 > 0. Since, by (22),
the set Cδ is forward invariant, it follows that for any initial condition in Cδ,
strategy 4 is eliminated.
Now let ∇V0(x) = (∂V0/∂xi)1≤i≤n (x) denote the gradient of V0 at x. It is
easy to see that V0 is C
1. Therefore it follows from (22), v˙0(t) = ∇V0(x(t)) · x˙(t)
and compactness of {x ∈ S4 : V0(x) = δ} that
∃γ > 0, [v0(t) = δ ⇒ v˙0(t) ≥ γ > 0] . (24)
Similarly, since Cδ is compact, it follows from (23) that there exists γ
′ > 0 such
that
x ∈ Cδ ⇒ (U0x)4 − x ·U0x ≤ −γ
′ < 0. (25)
Since x˙ is Lipschitz in the payoff matrix, it follows from (24) that for U close
enough to U0, we still have v0(t) = δ ⇒ v˙0 > 0 under the perturbed dynamics.
Similarly, due to (25), we still have x ∈ Cδ ⇒ (Ux)4 − x ·Ux < 0. Therefore
the above reasoning applies and for every initial condition in Cδ, strategy 4 is
eliminated.
Note that δ can be chosen arbitrarily small (see (21)). Therefore, to complete
the proof of proposition 5.1, it suffices to show that if C is a compact set disjoint
from E0 then, for δ sufficiently small, C ⊂ Cδ. But since V0 is positive on S4\E0,
and since C is compact and disjoint from E0, it follows that there exists δ
′ > 0
such that, for all x in C, V0(x) ≥ δ
′; hence, for all δ ≤ δ′, C ⊂ Cδ. This
completes the proof.
Hofbauer (2000, section 6) considers the following generalization of the BNN
dynamics:
x˙i = f(ki)− xi
n∑
j=1
f(kj) (26)
where f : R+ → R+ is a continuous function with f(0) = 0 and f(u) > 0 for
u > 0, and where ki is defined as in (15). The results of this section generalize
to any such dynamics:
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Proposition 5.3 Consider a dynamics of type (26). If C is a closed subset
of S4 disjoint from E0, then there exists a neighborhood of G0 such that, for
every game in this neighborhood and every initial condition in C, x4(t)→ 0 as
t→ +∞.
Proof. Replace V0(x) by W0(x) :=
∑
i F (ki(x)), where F is an anti-derivative
of f , and replace ki by f(ki). Let f¯ =
∑
i f(ki), f˜i = f(ki)/f¯ , and f˜ =(
f˜i
)
1≤i≤N
. Finally, let w0(t) = W0(x(t)). As shown by Hofbauer (2000),
w˙0 = f¯
2
[
(˜f− x) ·U0(˜f− x)− (˜f− x) ·U0x
]
which is the analogue of (19). Then apply exactly the same proof as for BNN.
6 Robustness to the addition of mixed strategies
as new pure strategies
We showed that for many dynamics, there exists an open set of symmetric 4×4
games for which, from an open set of initial conditions, the unique strategy used
in correlated equilibrium is eliminated. Since we might not want to rule out the
possibility that individuals use mixed strategies, and that mixed strategies be
heritable, it is important to check whether our results change if we explicitly
introduce mixed strategies as new pure strategies of the game. The paradigm is
the following (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, section 7.2): there is an underlying
normal-form game, called the base game, and a finite number of types of agents.
Each type plays a pure or mixed strategy of the base game. We assume that
each pure strategy of the base game is played (as a pure strategy) by at least one
type of agent, but otherwise we make no assumptions on the agents’ types. The
question is whether we can nonetheless be sure that, for an open set of initial
conditions, all strategies used in correlated equilibrium are eliminated. This
section shows that the answer is positive, at least for the best-response dynamics
and the replicator dynamics. We first need some notations and vocabulary.
Let G be a finite game with strategy set I = {1, ..., N} and payoff matrix U.
A finite game G′ is built on G by adding mixed strategies as new pure strategies
if:
First, letting I ′ = {1, ..., N,N + 1, ..., N ′} be the set of pure strategies of G′
and U′ its payoff matrix, we may associate to each pure strategy i in I ′ a mixed
strategy pi in SN in such a way that:
∀i ∈ I ′, ∀j ∈ I ′, e′i ·U
′e′j = p
i ·Upj (27)
where e′i is the unit vector in SN ′ corresponding to the pure strategy i.
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Second, if 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the pure strategy i in the game G′ corresponds to the
pure strategy i in the base game G:
1 ≤ i ≤ N ⇒ pi = ei. (28)
If µ′ = (µ(k, l))1≤k,l≤N ′ is a probability distribution over I
′× I ′, then it induces
the probability distribution µ on I × I given by:
µ(i, j) =
∑
1≤k,l≤N ′
µ′(k, l)pki p
l
j ∀(i, j) ∈ I × I.
It follows from a version of the revelation principle (see Myerson, 1994) that, if
G′ is built on G by adding mixed strategies as new pure strategies, then for any
correlated equilibrium µ′ of G′, the induced probability distribution on I × I
is a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, if G is a 4 × 4 symmetric game with
e4 ⊗ e4 as unique correlated equilibrium, then µ
′ is a correlated equilibrium of
G′ if and only if, for every k, l in I ′ such that µ′(k, l) is positive, pk = pl = e4.
Thus, the unique strategy of G used in correlated equilibria of G′ is strategy 4.
We show below that:
Proposition 6.1 For the replicator dynamics and for the best-response dynam-
ics, there exists an open set of 4× 4 symmetric games such that, for any game
G in this set:
(i) e4 ⊗ e4 is the unique correlated equilibrium of G
(ii) For any game G′ built on G by adding mixed strategies as new pure
strategies and for an open set of initial conditions, every pure strategy k in I ′
such that pk4 > 0 is eliminated.
(the open set of initial conditions in property (ii) is a subset of SN ′ , the simplex
of mixed strategies of G′, and may depend on G′)
6.1 Proof for the best-response dynamics
Let G be a finite game and let G′ be a finite game built on G by adding mixed
strategies of G as new pure strategies. Associate to each mixed strategy x′ in
SN ′ the induced mixed strategy x in SN defined by:
x :=
N ′∑
k=1
x′kp
k. (29)
Let x′(·) be a solution of the best-response dynamics in G′ and x(·) the induced
mapping from R+ to SN .
Proposition 6.2 x(·) is a solution of the best-response dynamics in G.
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Proof. For almost all t ≥ 0, there exists a vector b′ ∈ BR(x′(t)) such that
x˙′(t) = b′ − x′(t). Let b :=
∑
k∈I′ b
′
kp
k ∈ SN . It follows from (29) that:
x˙(t) =
N ′∑
k=1
x˙′kp
k =
N ′∑
k=1
(b′k − x
′
k)p
k = b− x(t). (30)
Furthermore, since b′ is a best response to x′(t), it follows from (27) and (28)
that b is a best response to x(t). Together with (30), this implies that, for
almost all t, x˙ ∈ BR(x)− x. The result follows.
Since
xi(t)→ 0⇒
(
∀k ∈ N ′,
[
pki > 0⇒ x
′
k(t)→ 0
])
proposition 6.1 follows from propositions 4.1 and 6.2.
6.2 Proof for the replicator dynamics
Recall that G0 denotes game (1) with α = 0. Since, as already mentioned,
every neighborhood of G0 contains an open set of games with e4⊗ e4 as unique
correlated equilibrium, it suffices to show that every game close enough to G0
satisfies property (ii) of proposition 6.1. This is done in the appendix.
The intuition is the following: first note that, for a game G close to G0, the
set Γ defined in (2) is an attractor, close to which strategy 4 earns less than
average. Now consider a game G′ built on G by adding mixed strategies as new
pure strategies and let Γ′ denote the subset of SN ′ corresponding to Γ:
Γ′ = {x ∈ SN ′ : x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 and x1x2x3 = 0}
For an initial condition close to Γ′: (a) as long as the share of strategies k ≥ 4
remains low, the solution remains close to Γ′; (b) as long as the solution is close
to Γ′, strategy 4 earns less than average and its share decreases; (c) as long as
the share of strategy 4 does not increase, the share of strategies k ≥ 5 remains
low; moreover, if the share of strategy x4 decreases, so does, on average, the
share of each added mixed strategy in which strategy 4 is played with positive
probability.
Putting (a), (b) and (c) together gives the result.
7 Discussion
We showed that elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is a
robust phenomenon, in that it occurs for many dynamics, an open set of games
and an open set of initial conditions. Furthermore, at least for some of the lead-
ing dynamics, the results are robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new
pure strategies. Under the replicator dynamics, the best-response dynamics or
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the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, the basin of attraction of the Nash
equilibrium of (1) can be made arbitrarily small. In particular, the minimal dis-
tance from the cyclic attractor to the basin of attraction of the Nash equilibrium
can be made much larger than the minimal distance from the Nash equilibrium
to the basin of attraction of the cyclic attractor. The latter would thus be
stochastically stable in a model a` la Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993).6 These
results show a sharp difference between evolutionary dynamics and “adaptive
heuristics” such as no-regret dynamics (Hart and Mas-Collel, 2003; Hart, 2005)
or hypothesis testing (Young, 2004, chapter 8).
Some limitations of our results should however be stressed. First, our results
have been shown here only for single-population dynamics. They imply that
for some games and some interior initial conditions, two-population dynamics
eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium7; but maybe not for an
open set of games nor for an open set of initial conditions.
Second, the monotonic and weakly sign-preserving dynamics of section 3
are non-innovative: strategies initially absent do not appear. This has the
effect that, even when focusing on interior initial conditions, the growth of
the share of the population playing strategy i is limited by the current value
of this share. This is appropriate if we assume that agents have to meet an
agent playing strategy i to become aware of the possibility of playing strategy
i; but in general, as discussed by e.g. Swinkels (1993, p.459), this seems more
appropriate in biology than in economics. While our results hold also for some
important innovative dynamics, such as the best-response dynamics and a family
of dynamics including the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, more general
results would be welcome.
Third, in the games we considered, the unique correlated equilibrium is a
strict Nash equilibrium, and is thus asymptotically stable under most reasonable
dynamics, including all those we studied. Thus, there is still an important
connection between equilibria and the outcome of evolutionary dynamics.
For Nash equilibrium, these three limitations can be overcome, at least par-
tially: there are wide classes of multi-population innovative dynamics for which
there exists an open set of games such that, for an open set of initial condi-
tions, all strategies belonging to the support of at least one Nash equilibrium
are eliminated (Viossat, 2005, chapter 11). Moreover, for the single-population
replicator dynamics or the single-population best-response dynamics, there are
games for which, for almost all initial conditions, all strategies used in Nash
6The (unperturbed) dynamics used by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) is a discrete-
time version of the best-response dynamics, but it could easily be replaced by a discrete-time
version of another dynamics.
7This is because for symmetric two-player games with symmetric initial conditions, two-
population dynamics reduce to single-population dynamics, at least for the replicator dynam-
ics, the best-response dynamics and the Brown-von-Neumann Nash dynamics.
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equilibrium are eliminated (Viossat, 2005, chapter 12). Whether these results
extend to correlated equilibrium is an open question.
A Proof of proposition 6.1 for the replicator dy-
namics
We need to show that for every game close enough to G0, property (ii) of propo-
sition 6.1 is satisfied. As in section 5, let E0 = [n, e4], with n = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0).
For x in S4\{e4}, let
V (x) := 3
(x1x2x3)
1/3
x1 + x2 + x3
.
The function V takes its maximal value 1 on E0\{e4} and its minimal value 0
on the set {x ∈ S4\{e4} : x1x2x3 = 0}. Fix δ in ]0, 1[. If V (x) ≤ δ then x /∈ E0,
hence it follows from (20) that, at x, strategy 4 earns strictly less than average.
Together with a compactness argument, this implies that there exists γ1 > 0
such that:
V (x) ≤ δ ⇒ [(U0x)4 − x ·U0x ≤ −γ1] . (31)
Furthermore, it is shown in (Viossat, 2007a) that in G0, under the replicator
dynamics, the function V (x) decreases strictly along interior trajectories (except
those starting in E0). More precisely, for every interior initial condition x(0) /∈
E0 and every t in R, the function v0(t) := V (x(t)) satisfies v˙0(t) < 0. Together
with the compactness of {x ∈ S4\{e4}, V (x) = δ}, this implies that there exists
γ2 > 0 such that
v0(t) = δ ⇒ v˙0(t) ≤ −γ2. (32)
Fix a 4× 4 matrix U and a solution x(·) of the replicator dynamics with payoff
matrix U, with x(0) 6= e4. Let v(t) := V (x(t)). Thus, the difference between v0
and v is that, in the definition of v, x(·) is a solution of the replicator dynamics
for the payoff matrix U and not for U0. Since (Ux)4 − x · Ux and x˙ are
Lipschitz in U, it follows from (31) and (32) that there exists γ > 0 such that,
if ||U−U0|| < γ:
V (x) ≤ δ ⇒ [(Ux)4 − x ·Ux ≤ −γ] (33)
and
v(t) = δ ⇒ v˙(t) ≤ −γ. (34)
Fix a game G with payoff matrix U such that ||U−U0|| < γ. Let G
′ be a game
built on G by adding mixed strategies of G as new pure strategies, and let U′
be its payoff matrix. For x′ in SN ′ such that x
′
1 + x
′
2 + x
′
3 > 0, let
V ′(x′) := 3
(x′1x
′
2x
′
3)
1/3
x′1 + x
′
2 + x
′
3
.
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Consider a solution x′(·) of the replicator dynamics in G′ (with
∑
1≤i≤3 x
′
i(0) >
0) and let v′(t) = V ′(x′(t)). On the face of SN ′ spanned by the strategies of the
original game: 
x′ ∈ SN ′ :
∑
1≤i≤4
x′i = 1

 ,
the replicator dynamics behaves just as in the base-game. Therefore, (33) and
(34) imply trivially that:

 ∑
1≤i≤4
x′i = 1 and V
′(x′) ≤ δ

⇒ [(U′x′)4 − x′ ·U′x′ ≤ −γ] (35)
and 
 ∑
1≤i≤4
x′i = 1 and v
′(t) = δ

⇒ v˙′(t) ≤ −γ. (36)
Now define x¯′ ∈ SN ′ as the projection of x
′ on the face of SN ′ spanned by the
strategies of the original game. That is,
x¯′i =
x′i∑
1≤j≤4 x
′
j
if 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, and x¯′i = 0 otherwise.
Note that V ′(x′) = V (x¯′). Furthermore, a simple computation shows that
max
1≤i≤N ′
|x′i − x¯
′
i| ≤ N
′ max
5≤k≤N ′
x′k.
Therefore, since (U′x′)4 − x
′ ·U′x′ and the vector field x˙′ are Lipschitz in x′,
it follows from (35) and (36) that there exist positive constants η and γ′ such
that [
max
5≤k≤N ′
x′k ≤ η and V
′(x′) ≤ δ
]
⇒ (U′x′)4 − x
′ ·U′x′ ≤ −γ′ (37)
and [
max
5≤k≤N ′
x′k ≤ η and v
′(t) = δ
]
⇒ v˙′(t) ≤ −γ′. (38)
Fix y′ ∈ SN ′ such that
∑
1≤i≤4
y′i = 1, V
′(y′) < δ and C := min
1≤i≤3
y′i > 0.
There exists an open neighborhood Ω of y′ in SN ′ such that
∀x′ ∈ Ω,
[
min
1≤i≤3
x′i > C/2, max
5≤k≤N ′
x′k < Cη/2, and V
′(x′) < δ
]
.
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Consider an interior solution x′(·) of the replicator dynamics in G′ with initial
condition in Ω. Recall that pk denotes the mixed strategy of G associated with
the pure strategy k of G′. To prove proposition 6.1 for the replicator dynamics,
it suffices to show that:
Proposition A.1 For all k in {4, ..., N ′} such that pk4 > 0, x
′
k(t)→t→+∞ 0.
Proof. We begin with two lemmas:
Lemma A.2 Let T > 0 and k ∈ {5, ..., N ′}. If x′4(T ) ≤ x
′
4(0) then x
′
k(T ) < η.
Proof. By construction of G′, strategy k ∈ I ′ earns the same payoff as the
mixed strategy
∑
1≤i≤4 p
k
i e
′
i:
(U′x′)k =
∑
1≤i≤4
pki (U
′x′)i ∀x
′ ∈ SN ′ .
Therefore, it follows from the definition of the replicator dynamics that:
x˙′k
x′k
=
∑
1≤i≤4
pki
x˙′i
x′i
.
Integrating between 0 and T and taking the exponential of both sides leads to:
x′k(T ) = x
′
k(0)
∏
1≤i≤4
(
x′i(T )
x′i(0)
)pki
. (39)
Noting that for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, we have x′i(T ) ≤ 1, 1/x
′
i(0) ≤ 2/C and 1 ≤ 2/C, we
get: ∏
1≤i≤3
(
x′i(T )
x′i(0)
)pki
≤
∏
1≤i≤3
(
2
C
)pki
=
(
2
C
)1−pk
4
≤
2
C
. (40)
Since furthermore x′k(0) < Cη/2, we obtain from (39) and (40):
x′k(T ) <
Cη
2
2
C
(
x′4(T )
x′4(0)
)pk
4
= η
(
x′4(T )
x′4(0)
)pk
4
. (41)
The result follows.
Lemma A.3 For all t > 0, maxk∈{5,...,N ′} x
′
k(t) < η and v
′(t) < δ.
Proof. Otherwise there is a first time T > 0 such that maxk∈{5,...,N ′} x
′
k(T ) = η
or v′(T ) = δ (or both). It follows from (37) and the definition of the replicator
dynamics that if 0 ≤ t ≤ T then
x˙′
4
x′
4
(t) ≤ −γ′ < 0. Therefore x′4(T ) ≤ x
′
4(0). By
lemma A.2, this implies that maxk∈{5,...,N ′} x
′
k(T ) < η. Therefore, v
′(T ) = δ.
Due to (38), this implies that v˙′(T ) < 0. Therefore, there exists a time T1 with
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0 < T1 < T such that v
′(T1) > δ, hence a time T2 with 0 < T2 < T1 < T such
v′(T2) = δ, contradicting the minimality of T .
We now conclude: it follows from lemma A.3, equation (37) and the defini-
tion of the replicator dynamics that for all t ≥ 0, x′4(t) ≤ exp(−γ
′t)x′4(0). By
(41) this implies that for every k in {5, ..., N ′},
∀t ≥ 0, x′k(t) < η exp(−p
k
4γ
′t).
Therefore, if pk4 > 0 then x
′
k(t)→ 0 as t→ +∞.
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